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JURISDICTION 
The Appellees, Alan M. Collier and Mike Youngberg (hereinafter "Mr. 
Collier" and "Mr. Youngberg" do not dispute Appellants' statement of Jurisdiction 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues, as stated by the Appellants' beginning at page 1 of their Brief, are, 
at best, convoluted and are more appropriately characterized as 'argument' and/or 
'self- serving conclusions' rather than a statement of issues presented for review in 
this appeal. Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg submit that the issues of this appeal are: 
1. Did Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg owe a legal duty to the Appellants 
under the facts presented? 
2. Could Appellants justifiably rely on Mr. Youngberg's statements 
concerning the effect of the sign lien on the property purchased by Appellants from 
Clearwater Oaks, LLC1. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg do not dispute the Standard of Review as set 
forth in Appellants' Brief. 
1
 It is undisputed that Mr. Collier had no contact with Appellants until over a 
year after the Appellants' purchased the property from Clearwater Oaks. 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions in Utah Code Ann, are of importance in this 
appeal: 
(1) Utah Code Ann. §16-1 Oa-622. Liability of shareholders. 
(1) A purchaser from a corporation of shares issued by 
the corporation is not liable to the corporation or its 
creditors with respect to the shares except to pay or 
provide the consideration for which the issuance of the 
shares was authorized under Section 16-10a-621 or 
specified in the subscription agreement under Section 
16-10a-620. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of 
incorporation, a shareholder or subscriber for shares of 
a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts 
of the corporation solely by reason of the ownership of 
the corporation's shares. 
(2) Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-104. Separate legal entity. 
A company formed under this chapter is a legal entity 
distinct from its members. 
(3) Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-116. Member or manager as a party to 
proceedings. 
A member or manager of a company is not a proper party 
to proceedings by or against a company, except when the 
object is to enforce a member's or manager's right 
against, or liability to, the company. 
(4) Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-601. General rule. 
Except as provided in Section 48-2c-602, no organizer, 
member, manager, or employee of a company is 
personally liable under a judgment, decree, or order of a 
2 
court, or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, or 
liability of the company or for the acts or omissions of 
the company or of any other organizer, member, 
manager, or employee of the company. 
(5) Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-605. No formalities required to maintain 
limited liability. 
The failure of a company to maintain records, to hold 
meetings, or to observe any formalities or requirements 
imposed by this chapter or by the articles of organization 
or the operating agreement is not a ground for imposing 
personal liability on any member, manager, or employee 
for any debt, obligation, or liability of the company. 
(6) Utah Code Ann. §57-3-102. Record imparts notice - Change in interest 
rate - Validity of document - Notice of unnamed interests - Conveyance by grantee. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and 
certified, in the manner prescribed by this title, each 
original document or certified copy of a document 
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not 
acknowledged, each copy of a notice of location 
complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing 
statement complying with Section 70A-9a-502, whether 
or not acknowledged shall, from the time of recording 
with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all 
persons of their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a 
change in the interest rate in accordance with the terms 
of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured 
obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority 
of the document provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a 
document with respect to the parties to the document and 
all other persons who have notice of the document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a 
nominal consideration, names the grantee as trustee, or 
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otherwise purports to be in trust without naming 
beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not 
charge any third person with notice of any interest of the 
grantor or of the interest of any other person not named 
in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the 
interest granted to him free and clear of all claims not 
disclosed in the document in which he appears as grantee 
or in any other document recorded in accordance with 
this title that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, 
specifies the interest claimed, and describes the real 
property subject to the interest. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case filed by the Appellants originally named Chicago Title Company, 
Bonneville Tile Company, Clearwater Oaks, L.L.C. ("Clearwater Oaks"), Alan 
Collier, and Mike Youngberg as defendants. (Court Record, page 4). The original 
Complaint filed by the Appellants alleged as causes of action: fraud-against all 
defendants, conspiracy to defraud-against all defendants, negligent misrepresentation-
against all defendants, breach of contract-against Clearwater Oaks, breach of 
warranty-against Clearwater Oaks, and constructive trust-against Mr. Collier and Mr. 
Youngberg. (Court Record, page 4). Thereafter, pursuant to leave of the trial court, 
the Appellants filed an Amended Complaint which added two new causes of action, 
to wit: fraudulent nondisclosure-against Bonneville Title Company, Clearwater Oaks, 
Collier, and Youngberg and breach of good faith-against Chicago Title and 
Bonneville Title Companies. (Court Record, page 344). 
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During the proceedings below, the Appellants entered into settlements with 
Chicago Title and Bonneville Title Companies and dismissed them as parties to the 
litigation. (Court Record, page 365 and page 750, respectively). On October 9,2002 
the Second District Court, the Honorable Glen R. Dawson granted Summary 
Judgment to Collier and Youngberg dismissing them individually from the litigation. 
(Court Record, page 758). On October 9, 2002, the District Court granted 
Appellants' Motion to Dismiss without prejudice Clearwater Oaks as the sole 
remaining Defendant in the trial court litigation. (Court Record, page 757). 
The Appellants appealed the District Court's Order which granted Collier and 
Youngberg's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Court Record, page 758). 
Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg submit that the characterizations by Appellants 
in their "Statement of the Case" are irrelevant, misleading, inconsistent with the 
proceeding in the trial court, argumentative, and should be disregarded. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg submit that the facts set forth below are 
relevant to the disposition of this appeal. Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg object to 
Appellants' "Statement of Facts" as those alleged facts are inconsistent with the 
record, are unfounded, are misleading and based upon what the Appellants 'allege' 
or 'are prepared to prove'. These "alleged" facts raised by the Appellants are 
addressed in the section of disputed facts set forth below. 
5 
A. Facts, 
1. Clearwater Oaks was organized in 1997. (Appellants' Brief, page 12) 
2. In 1997, Clearwater Oaks purchased lots in a subdivision adjoining the 
west side of the 1-15 corridor in West Bountiful. (Appellants' Brief page 12.) 
3. At all times, Clearwater Oaks operated as a separate and distinct entity 
maintaining records, bank accounts, filing taxes, etc. (Court Record, pages 197,311). 
4. At no time in any transaction did either Mr. Collier or Mr. Youngberg 
sign personally any document for Clearwater Oaks. The Appellants were asked 
specifically in Requests for Admission: 
Request No. 1. Admit that the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract and closing documents for the sale of the 
subject Property were signed by Defendant Clearwater 
Oaks, L.C. as seller. 
Response: Admit. 
Request No. 4. Admit that Defendants Collier and 
Youngberg did not individually sign any documents 
relating to the sale of the property. 
Response: Admit. 
(Court Record, pages 325, 326). 
5. Mr. Collier had no contact of any nature whatsoever with the Appellants 
prior to the Appellants purchasing the property which is the subject of their lawsuit. 
(Court Record, page 199). Mr. Youngberg's contacts with the Appellants before the 
sale of the property was as a member of Clearwater Oaks, when a plat map of the 
6 
subdivision was provided to Appellants, and also executing documents for Clearwater 
Oaks. (Court Record, pages 325, 326). 
6. Mr. Collier's first contact with either of the Appellants occurred more 
than one (1) year after the Appellants purchased the subject property. (Court Record, 
page 199, 317). 
7. The Appellants were represented by a real estate agent at the time they 
purchased the property from Clearwater Oaks. (Appellants' Brief, page 132; Real 
Estate Purchase Contract for Residential Construction ("REPC) Court Record, page 
304, a copy of the REPC is attached hereto as Addendum "A") 
8. Preliminary title statements, commitments, and insurance were procured 
and provided to the Appellants by Bonneville and/or Chicago Title Companies. 
(Appellants' Brief, page 13 and 15, REPC - Addendum "A") 
9. The REPC was signed by Mr. Youngberg as a member of Clearwater 
Oaks. (See Appellants' Brief, page 13, REPC - Addendum "A") 
10. The subj ect real property was conveyed to the Appellants by Clearwater 
Oaks by Warranty Deed on December 21, 1999. (Appellants' Brief, page 15). 
11. The Trial Court, after substantial briefing and oral argument ruled, in 
relevant part as follows: 
2
 Appellants and Clearwater Oaks used the same real estate agent, Pat Mason. 
(See page 2 of the REPC and Court Record page 304). 
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Defendants Collier and Youngberg as members of 
Clearwater Oaks, L.C. cannot be held personally liable 
for the acts of Defendant Clearwater Oaks. 
Plaintiffs had legal notice of the Lease at the time they 
purchased the Property. 
Because the Lease the Plaintiffs claim encumbered the 
Property was a public record, the Plaintiffs cannot 
demonstrate a justifiable reliance and therefore the 
causes of action against Defendants Collier and 
Youngberg must be dismissed. 
(Conclusions of Law fflfl, 3, 4, Court Record, page 752). 
B. Disputed Facts Alleged by the Appellants, 
1. At page 12 of their Brief, the Appellants state: 
Shortly after the purchase, Appellees and Clearwater 
Oaks entered into a dispute with the bill board sign 
company that held a leasehold right to construct and 
maintain billboard signs on the lots Appellees had 
purchased. 
This statement is inconsistent with the facts. Clearwater Oaks owned the 
property and as such neither Collier nor Youngberg individually disputed or had the 
right to dispute the sign company lease. The fallacy of Appellants' argument is based 
here, and throughout their Brief, that they consistently treat Mr. Collier and Mr. 
Youngberg and Clearwater Oaks as one and the same, even though Clearwater Oaks 
is a distinct and separate legal entity as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-104. 
2. At page 13 of their Brief, Appellants state: 
Before contracting, Appellee Youngberg provided the 
Dygerts with a copy of a plat map purporting to show 
8 
easements of record affecting Lot 2 [the subject 
property]. (Citations omitted). The plat map showed that 
the billboard sign lease only encumbered a portion of 
another lot in the subdivision - Lot - 5 - which is where 
a bill board sign is conspicuously located. 
A copy of the Plat Map is attached hereto as Addendum "B". First, the map 
states 'what it states'. Moreover, the Appellants were clearly on notice of the 
potential that the sign lien could affect the property they were contemplating 
purchasing and, therefore, they had a duty to inquire. 
3. At page 14 of their Brief, Appellants state: 
At the time of contracting on May 17, 1999, Appellee 
Youngberg also provided the Dygerts with a form real 
estate document entitled "Seller's Property Condition 
Disclosure (Land)," in which he affirmatively 
misrepresented that: l)there was no ongoing litigation 
affecting Lot 2; 2) there were no undisclosed easements 
affecting Lot 2; and 3) there was nothing that should be 
disclosed that materially or adversely affected the value 
of Lot 2." (Citations omitted). 
A copy of the Seller's Property Condition Disclosure is attached as Addendum 
"C". The allegation by Appellants is factually dishonest and misleading. First, the 
document specifically provided: 
THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT IS NOT A 
WARRANTY OR GUARANTEE OF ANY KIND BY 
SELLER.... BUYER HAS BEEN ADVISED BY THE 
COMPANY TO SEEKCOMPETENTPROFESSIONAL 
ADVICE FROM PROPERTY INSPECTORS AND 
OTHER PROFESSIONALS IN ORDER TO 
EVALUATE THE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY 
AND THE DISCLOSURES CONTAINED HEREIN. 
BUYER FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT 
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NEITHER THE COMPANY, NOR ANY OF ITS 
AGENTS, WILL MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS 
OR WARRANTIES REGARDING THE CONDITION 
OF THE PROPERTY OR REGARDING THE 
ACCURACY OF ANY STATEMENTS RELATING TO 
THE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY CONTAINED 
HEREIN. 
(Court Record, page 606). Second, as the Appellants are well aware, the lease was 
disclosed as a public record. Third, in Clearwater Oaks' opinion, there was nothing 
that materially or adversely affected the value of Lot 2. Finally, it should be noted 
that this document was not signed by Mr. Youngberg individually, but by Mr. 
Youngberg as a member of Clearwater Oaks. 
4. At page 14 of their Brief, Appellants state: 
At the time of contracting, the Dygerts requested that 
they be provided with a report on the status of title of Lot 
2. (Citation Omitted) Shortly thereafter, Appellees 
though their realtor, provided the Dygerts with a 
preliminary title report from Bonneville Title Company, 
Inc. ("Bonneville") that purposefully did not disclose the 
billboard sign lease as an encumbrance on Lot 2. 
(Citations Omitted) All title reports, title insurance 
commitments and title insurance policies provided 
thereafter to the Dygerts by Appellees or Bonneville 
failed to disclose the bill board sign lease as an 
encumbrance on Lot 2 (Citations Omitted). 
The Appellants here again, as they have done repeatedly throughout their 
Brief, mischaracterize Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg as being Clearwater Oaks and 
vice versa. First, Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg did nothing througji their realtor. 
Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg had no realtor, were not parties to the transaction, and 
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had no property to sell to the Appellants. In point of fact, Clearwater Oaks was 
represented by the same realtor as the Appellants, a fact of which the Appellants are 
well aware since they have also initiated a separate lawsuit against the realtor. 
(Stephanie Dygert and Daniel K. Dygert v. Lane Realty. Lane Beattv. Coldwell 
Banker, and Patricia Mason. Civil No 020700185, filed in the Second District Court, 
in and for Davis County, Utah). 
Bonneville Title is a separate and distinct entity which was retained to provide 
title insurance to Appellants. If there was a breach of the policy, Bonneville Title 
would be separately and distinctly responsible. Again, Appellants are well aware of 
the title company's liability since they sued both Chicago Title and Bonneville Title 
Companies and entered into a separate settlement with both, as referenced above. Mr. 
Collier and Mr. Youngberg did not provide title insurance policies to the Appellants 
and had no reason to do so since they were not the sellers of the property. (See 
Addendum "B"). These allegations of the Appellants are additional examples of 
mixing parties together without regard to the actual facts and relationships of the 
parties. 
5. At pages 13 and 15, with regard to different allegations, the Appellants 
state: 
The Dygerts have alleged and are prepared to prove at 
trial " 
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Summary Judgments are made based upon undisputed fact. WebBank v. 
American General Annuity Service Corp., 2002 UT 88, 54 P.3d 1139. Therefore the 
referenced allegations are irrelevant and without support and must be disregarded. 
It is however important to note that for each of these referenced allegations the 
Appellants have referred to the trial court record and that assumedly the trial court 
took the allegations into consideration in its ruling granting the summary judgment. 
6. At page 15 of Appellants9 Brief, they state 
[t]he preliminary title reports, title insurance 
commitments and title insurance policy issued to the 
Dygerts did not disclose the existence of the billboard 
sign lease. . . . Appellees and Bonneville affirmatively 
endeavored to conceal the existence of the billboard sign 
lease from the Dygerts. (Citations Omitted) 
First, as noted repeatedly above, the property was owned by and sold to the 
Appellants by Clearwater Oaks, of this there is no dispute. Second, the preliminary 
title reports, title commitments, and title policies were not the responsibility of Mr. 
Youngberg or Mr. Collier as acknowledged by the Appellants9 lawsuits against the 
issuing title companies and the Appellants' separate settlements with those entities. 
Accordingly, such allegations are irrelevant and without merit to the present appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
L 
The Trial Court was correct in finding that as a matter of law neither Mr. 
Collier nor Mr. Youngberg can be personally liable for the acts or omissions of 
Clearwater Oaks. 
II. 
The Trial Court was correct in finding that Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg did 
not have a legal duty to the Appellants. 
III. 
The Trial Court was correct in finding that Appellants had legal notice of the 
Lease at the time they purchased the property. Therefore, Appellants could not 
justifiably rely on Mr. Collier or Mr. Youngberg's actions or lack thereof. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AS A MATTER OF LAW, ALAN COLLIER AND MIKE 
YOUNGBERG CANNOT BE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OR 
OMISSIONS OF CLEARWATER OAKS. L.C. 
Chapter 2c of Section 48 of Utah Code Ann, is entitled "Utah Revised Limited 
Liability Company Act". Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-104 provides: 
A company formed under this chapter is a legal entity 
distinct from its members. (Emphasis added). 
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Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-l 16 provides: 
A member or manager of a company is not a proper 
party to proceedings by or against a company, except 
when the object is to enforce a member's or manager's 
right against, or liability to, the company. (Emphasis 
added). 
Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-601 provides: 
Except as provided in Section 48-2c-602, no organizer, 
member, manager, or employee of a company is 
personally liable under a judgment, decree, or order of 
a court, or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, or 
liability of the company or for the acts or omissions of 
the company or of any other organizer, member, 
manager, or employee of the company. (Emphasis 
added). 
Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-605 provides: 
The failure of a company to maintain records, to hold 
meetings, or to observe any formalities or requirements 
imposed by this chapter or by the articles of organization 
or the operating agreement is not a ground for imposing 
personal liability on any member, manager, or employee 
for any debt, obligation, or liability of the company. 
The laws of this state are clear that a member of a limited liability company 
is not a proper party to a proceeding against the limited liability company (UCA 48-
2c-116) and that a member of a limited liability company cannot be found personally 
liable for any debt of the limited liability company (UCA 48-2c-601). 
Appellants' causes of action against Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg are 
transparent attempts to circumvent the protection the legislature and the courts afford 
to directors, officers, managers, and members of limited liability companies. Under 
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Appellants' theory, the protections provided to managers and members of limited 
liability companies acting on behalf of the limited liability company would be 
completely obliterated. There is no justification provided in Appellants' case for such 
a radical result and the chilling effect it would create in the transaction of business by 
legal entities in this state. 
II. THE VEIL OF PERSONAL PROTECTION AFFORDED 
TO MEMBERS OF A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY IS SIMILAR TO 
THE VEIL OF PROTECTION GIVEN TO SHAREHOLDERS. OFFICERS, 
AND DIRECTORS OF A CORPORATION. 
A member of a limited liability company in nature and effect is analogous to 
a shareholder, officer, or director of a corporation. The Utah Supreme Court held in 
Reedeker v. Salisbury. 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah App. 1998): 
The general rule is that a corporation is an entity separate 
and distinct from its officers, shareholders and directors 
and that they will not be held personally liable for the 
corporation's debts and obligations. 
Members of a limited liability company, like officers, shareholders, and 
directors of a corporation, as noted above, are separate and distinct from the limited 
liability company or corporation of which they may be a part. 
Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg were not parties to the conveyance and were 
acting at all times as members of Clearwater Oaks. Clearwater Oaks had, at the time 
the suit was initiated, been in existence for over four years, held annual meetings, 
filed tax returns, maintained a bank account, and maintained a tax identification 
number. 
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In Schafir v.Harrigan. 879 P.2d 1384,1389 (Utah App. 1994) the Utah Court 
of Appeals stated: 
This court has recognized that a corporation and its 
shareholders are separate and distinct legal entities and 
has validated the purpose of such a distinction to 
"insulate the stockholders from the liabilities of the 
corporation, thus limiting their liability to only the 
amount that the stockholders voluntarily put at risk." 
Additionally, we have stated that "fcjourts must balance 
piercing and insulating policies and [should] only 
reluctantly and cautiously pierce the corporate veil." 
To aid courts in deciding when to pierce the corporate 
veil, the Utah Supreme Court established a two-prong 
test in Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co,, 596 
P.2d 1029 (Utah 1979): 
[I]n order to disregard the corporate entity, 
there must be a concurrence of two 
circumstances: (1) there must be such 
unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation 
and the individual no longer exist, viz., the 
corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of one 
or a few individuals; and (2) the 
observance of the corporation form would 
sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an 
inequitable result would follow. 
(Emphasis added). (Citations omitted). 
The relevant facts of Schafir were as follows: Henry D. Moyle was named as 
a defendant. Moyle filed a motion for summary judgment requesting that the court 
dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint against him personally. The plaintiffs suggested to 
the court in Schafir that Moyle was the alter-ego of defendant AmDevCo., Inc. and 
was personally liable to the Schafirs for damages. To rebut the Schafirs9 alter ego 
16 
theory, Moyle supported his summary judgment motion by attaching copies of 
AmDevCo's articles of incorporation, minutes from board of director's meetings, 
corporate annual report filed with the State of Utah, and corporate tax returns. 
(Schafir at 1390). The Supreme Court held: 
We believe that Moyle's evidence satisfactorily 
demonstrates that AmDevCo observed the requisite 
corporate formalities and thus distinguished itself as 
more than Moyle's alter ego. Consequently, AmDevCo 
fails to meet the first prong of the Norman test regarding 
corporate formalities. 
Schafir at 1390. 
The Trial Court in this case specifically found: 
Defendant Clearwater Oaks, L.C. was organized and its 
Articles of Organization were filed with the Utah State 
Department of Commerce on November 28, 1997, and 
was, at all times relevant hereto, a valid existing limited 
liability company in good standing with the State of 
Utah. 
(Findings of Fact f 1). 
Accordingly, as a matter of law, the ruling of the Trial Court dismissing Mr. 
Collier and Mr. Youngberg must be affirmed. 
III. THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE A 
LEGAL DUTY TO THE PLAINTIFFS. 
Appellants assert that Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg individually engaged in 
the torts of conspiracy to defraud Appellants, fraudulently concealed material from 
Appellants, made intentional misrepresentations to Appellants, and/or made negligent 
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misrepresentations to Appellants. For a party to be liable for a tort, the party must 
have had a legal, recognized duty to the complaining party. 
The definition of "Tort" in Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, provides 
that a tort is: 
A private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of 
contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the 
form of an action for damages. A violation of a duty 
imposed by general law or otherwise upon all persons 
occupying the relation to each other which is involved in 
a given transaction. (Citation omitted). There must 
always be a violation of some duty owing to plaintiff, 
and generally such duty must arise by operation of law 
and not by mere agreement of the parties. Three 
elements of every tort action are: Existence of a legal 
duty from defendant to plaintiff, breach of duty and 
damage as proximate result. (Citation omitted). 
(Emphasis added). 
The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law to be 
determined by the Court. DeBrv v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000,1004 (Utah 
App. 1992); Ferreev. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). 
Clearwater Oaks negotiated with and sold to the Appellants a lot in the 
Clearwater subdivision. As referenced above, Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg did not 
sign any documents in the transaction with the Appellants personally, but only for and 
on behalf of Clearwater Oaks as authorized signing members of Clearwater Oaks. 
Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg had no duty personally to the Appellants in the 
transaction. While Clearwater Oaks may have had certain legal duties to Appellants 
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in the transaction, Appellants have not demonstrated any basis upon which a shift of 
those duties to Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg can be based. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) 
defined "duty"as: 
Duty is a question of whether the defendant is under any 
obligation for the benefit of a particular plaintiff. 
Without a showing of duty, Appellants cannot recover. Rollins v. Petersen, 
813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991). There was no legal duty of Mr. Collier and Mr. 
Youngberg created by reason of their membership in Clearwater Oaks nor could a 
legal duty by Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg to Appellants have been created by the 
facts of this case. The Trial Court's ruling finding no duty existed by Mr. Collier and 
Mr. Youngberg to the Appellants must be affirmed. 
IV. APPELLANTS5 CANNOT SHOW RELIANCE. 
To prevail on a cause of action for fraud a party must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence all of the essential elements of fraud, i. e., the making of a false 
representation concerning a presently existing material fact which the representor 
either knew to be false or made recklessly without sufficient knowledge, or the 
omission of a material fact when there is a duty to disclose, for the purpose of 
inducing action on the part of the other party, with actual, justifiable reliance 
resulting in damage to that party. Pace, v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 
(1952). 
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First, there was no duty personally on the part of Mr. Collier and Mr. 
Youngberg toward the Appellants in the transaction between Clearwater Oaks and 
Appellants. 
In the case of Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 
1980), the Court held: 
Misrepresentation may be made either by affirmative 
statement or by material omission, where there exists a 
duty to speak. Such a duty will not be found where the 
parties deal at arm's length, and where the underlying 
facts are reasonably within the knowledge of both 
parties. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff is 
obliged to take reasonable steps to inform himself and 
to protect his own interests. (Emphasis added). 
The property purchase by the Appellants was undisputably an arm's length 
transaction. The Appellants, through a realtor, made an offer to purchase the 
property, which offer was accepted by Clearwater Oaks. Since the transaction was 
an arms length vendor-vendee transaction between Appellants and Clearwater Oaks, 
Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg had no duty to the Appellants. 
As referenced above, the fraud cause of action alleged by the Appellants is a 
result of the alleged nondisclosure, misrepresentation, and/or concealment of the 
Reagan Sign lease affecting Clearwater Oaks' subdivision by Mr. Collier and Mr. 
Youngberg. Appellants acknowledged that the Reagan Lease was recorded as Entry 
No. 1127166, Book 1773, Page 460 in the office ofthe Davis County Recorder on the 
17th day of May 1994, long before Appellants purchased the property. 
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The Reagan Lease, as a matter of law, was of public record. Utah Code Ann, 
§57-3-102(1) provides in relevant part: 
Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, 
in the manner prescribed by this title,... shall from the 
time of recording with the appropriate count recorder, 
impart notice to all persons of their contents. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appellants, as a matter of law, had legal notice of the Reagan Lease. 
Therefore the element of justifiable reliance fails. It is also pertinent to observe that 
the Appellant, Mr. Dygert, is an attorney. Mr. Dygert was provided a copy of the 
Plat Map of the subdivision showing the Reagan sign in the subdivision and the 
Lease. Appellants had a duty as a matter of law to determine the effect of the recorded 
Lease on their property when Appellants became aware of the Lease and to protect 
themselves by determining if the lease affected property they were considering 
purchasing. Appellants, as a matter of law, cannot demonstrate a justifiable reliance 
on an alleged omission to disclose or by an alleged statement by Mr. Collier and Mr. 
Youngberg. 
InU.P.C. Inc. v. R.O.A. General Inc., 1999 UT App. 303, 990 P.2d 945, the 
plaintiff purchased a piece of property that was also subject to a Reagan Sign lease, 
and also alleged that it did not receive notice of the lease before the property was 
purchased. The plaintiff asserted that he inquired about the sign with the predecessor-
in-interest, but a written lease was not provided. The Supreme Court found: 
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Notwithstanding, Garco [plaintiff] has not claimed that 
it spoke with Reagan to determine whether Reagan 
possessed a written lease. A simple telephone call to 
Reagan could have confirmed or dispelled any 
question in this regard and would have led to Garco's 
learning of Reagan's interest. Thus, because Garco 
had "knowledge of certain facts (i.e., the sign's 
existence) and circumstances that [were] sufficient to 
give rise to a duty to inquire further" we hold that 
Garco had constructive knowledge of Reagan's lease 
. . . (Emphasis added). 
Id at 953. 
The Utah Supreme Court continued in U.P.C. Inc.: 
[IJnquiry notice 6occur[s] when circumstances arise that 
should put a reasonable person on guard so as to require 
further inquiry on his part.9 Whatever is notice enough 
to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call 
for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry 
might have led. When a person has sufficient 
information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed 
conversant of it. (Citations omitted). 
Appellants had notice of the existence of the Lease. It is undisputed that 
Appellants purchased the property knowing that the sign existed. Appellants, 
however, did not ask for details regarding the sign, nor did they make any other 
inquiry. Appellants did not exercise due diligence with respect to the sign. 
Accordingly, the ruling of the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
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V. THE CASES CITED BY THE APPELLANTS DO NOT 
SUPPORT THE PROPOSITIONS ALLEGED BY THE APPELLANTS, 
The cases and evidence submitted by the Appellants do not support the 
theories put forward in their appeal. Most notably the facts of the cases are 
inapposite to the undisputed facts of this case and, as such, the cited cases are not 
controlling. Appellants have, in the documents they have submitted, only referred to 
a portion of the document without regard to the whole. The document relied upon, 
when read in its entirety, does not support the position of the Appellants. Provided 
below are brief summaries of the cases cited and all of the relevant portions of the 
documents referenced by the Appellants. 
First, it is pertinent to note that the following facts are undisputed: 
(1) The property purchased by the Appellants was owned by 
Clearwater Oaks, an existing, valid, and operating Utah entity. 
(2) Neither Mr. Collier nor Mr. Youngberg personally signed any 
documents relating to the sale or transfer of the subject property. 
(3) The sales transactions was at arms length, the Appellants and 
Clearwater Oaks were represented by real estate agents and title insurance was 
procured for the benefit of the Appellants, and the Appellants have entered into 
settlements with the title companies in the litigation. 
(4) The sign lien, which is the basis for the Appellants' case, was 
recorded and a matter of public record at the time of the transaction. 
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(5) Mr. Collier did not have the occasion to meet personally with the 
Appellants until at least a year after the Appellants purchased the property. Mr. 
Youngberg's contact with the Appellants regarding the sale of the property was also 
limited. Mr. Youngberg in a separate transaction not involving Mr. Collier or 
Clearwater Oaks agreed to build a house on the property for the Appellants and it is 
alleged that Mr. Youngberg provided the Appellants a copy of a Plat Map which the 
Appellants claim demonstrated the area the recorded sign lease affected. 
A, Cases Cited by the Appellants upon which they assert 
support their claim of personal liability against Mr. Collier and Mr, Youngberg. 
1. Kaumans v. White Star Gas & Oil Co.. et aL 63 P.2d 231 (1936). 
Cited by the Appellants at pages 18,27,29,32 of their Brief. The Appellants cite this 
case for the proposition "because Appellees individually and actively participated in 
the commission of torts that injured the Dygerts, each Appellee is personally liable 
to the Dygerts for the injuries caused thereby". (Appellants' Brief, pg. 18). "[T]he 
Supreme Court had recognized that 'the agent is responsible to third persons when he 
is negligent in the performance of the duties which he undertakes, whether such act 
be termed misfeasance or nonfeasance9." (Appellants' Brief, pg. 27);. "As agents of 
the L.L.C., Appellees are subject to the venerable principles of agency liability...." 
(Appellants' Brief, pg. 29). And "[T]he supreme Court has recognized the common 
3
 As pointed out below, the Appellants did not assert a claim of "agency" in 
their Complaints, nor did Appellants argue this theory in the proceedings 
below. 
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law duty of an agent to a third party with whom the agent transacts on behalf of a 
principal." (Appellants' Brief, pg. 32). 
The facts of Kaumans are not on point. In Kaumans. plaintiff Kauman brought 
an action against defendants White Star Gas & Oil Company, a corporation, and Jack 
W.T. Pomeroy to recover for personal injuries suffered by him as a result of a 
gasoline explosion and fire. Pomeroy contended that as to him there was no evidence 
of negligence, since he did not personally participate in the work and the equipment 
used belonged to the Gas & Oil Company, that defendant was only an officer of the 
corporation, and Carter [an employee of the Gas and Oil Company] was not in his 
employ but was acting solely for the corporation. (Id. at pages 27 and 28). The Court 
held that Pomeroy was liable: 
by reason of the fact that he personally had an interest 
and participated as an individual in the operations in 
the course of which plaintiff received his injuries, and by 
reason of the fact that as the managing officer of the Gas 
& Oil Company, he assumed and owed the duty of 
providing reasonably safe and suitable equipment for the 
filling of the truck with gasoline from the tank car, and 
of making certain that the equipment which was used by 
plaintiff and Carter under the directions of Carter was 
reasonably safe, suitable, and proper for the use to which 
it was applied. (Emphasis added). 
(Id, page 38). 
Further the Court held that based upon the facts that Pomeroy, while he was 
acting as an officer of the Oil and Gas Company was also acting for himself and that 
in the: 
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particular transaction he and the company were engaged 
in a joint enterprise, were mutually co-operating in the 
matter of transferring the gasoline from the tank car to 
the defendant's service station as a matter of convenience 
and benefit to both. 
(Id. at page 38). 
In addition the Supreme Court further held in light of the facts of the case: 
that where the managing officer of a corporation could 
by the exercise of ordinary care have ascertained the 
unsafe condition of an appliance furnished by the 
corporation and used by an employee under the direction 
of such managing officer, the latter is personally liable 
for injuries resulting to such employee therefrom. 
(IdL at page 39). 
It is clear that the facts as stated in Kaumans are not on point and that it does 
not support the assertions for the creation of liability in this case against Mr. Collier 
and Mr. Youngberg since, among other reasons, Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg did 
not participate individually in the sale of the property from Clearwater Oaks to the 
Appellants. 
2. Penecost v. M.W. Harward. 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985). This case is 
cited in conjunction with Kaumans and therefore the references to Penecost are not 
restated here. 
In Penecost. a tenant sued the manager and the unknown owner(s) of the 
apartment in which she lived for forcibly evicting her and her two children and for 
retaining her furniture and personal possessions, all without resort to judicial process 
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and that the actions of defendant were intentional and malicious and that plaintiff was 
entitled to damages for conversion of her property and for expenses incurred as a 
result of the eviction and the detention of the property. (Id. at page 696). 
The Supreme Court held, at page 699 of Pentecost: 
If an agent commits a tort while acting on behalf of his 
principal, the fact that he is an agent does not insulate 
him from liability to the injured party. The agent's 
liability is determined solely upon the common-law 
obligation that every person must so act or use that 
which he controls as not to injure another. 
The facts of Pentecost are neither on point nor useful to this case. Further, as 
addressed below, presentation of the "agency" issue in inappropriate. 
3. HermansenvTasulis. 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235. This case is cited at 
pages 18, 30 and 33 of Appellants Brief. "As members and agents of the LLC, 
Appellees had a duty to disclose a known material defect in the property". 
(Appellants' Brief, pg. 18). "Appellees personally knew that the billboard sign lease 
was a material defect - 'something which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence 
and prudence would think to be of some importance in determining whether to buy 
or sell'." (Appellants' Brief, pg. 30). "In Utah 'sellers of real property owe a duty to 
disclose material known defects that cannot be discovered by a reasonable inspection 
by an ordinary prudent buyer'." (Appellants' Brief, pg. 33). 
The facts ofHermansen were: 
Tf 1 Plaintiffs, home owners, appeal from an order 
granting a motion for summary judgment to defendants, 
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a real estate broker and his agent, who were involved 
in the sale of real estate to plaintiffs." (Emphasis added) 
Tf 2 [p]laintiffs C. Dean and Carol N. Hermansen entered 
into an earnest money sales agreement with Stanley 
McDougal, a licensed contractor, to construct a home on 
lots located within the Wasatch Downs Subdivision 
which were owned by McDougal Shaw Development, 
LLC. 
% 3 Stanley McDougal is a part owner of McDougal 
Shaw Development. Stanley's wife, Terena McDougal, 
is a licensed real estate agent who worked for George 
Tasulis, d.b.a. Interchange Real Estate, a licensed real 
estate broker. When the Hermansens executed the 
earnest money sales agreement, Tasulis and Terena were 
engaged by McDougal Shaw Development to act as 
listing broker and agent, respectively. 
f 5 The Hermansens allege that at some point prior to 
April 30, 1994, Terena, Stanley, and Tasulis became 
aware, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have been aware, of significant problems with the 
stability of the soil and subsurface conditions at the 
subdivision. 
f 14 [T]he Hermansens assert that both Tasulis and 
Terena breached their duties to disclose potential 
problems with the property. 
f 18 The Hermansens allege that Tasulis and Terena 
breached duties owed to them as licenced real estate 
professionals in not disclosing known material defects in 
the property. 
In this case, neither Mr. Collier nor Mr. Youngberg were owners or sellers of 
the subject property. Neither Mr. Collier nor Mr. Youngberg acted as real estate 
brokers or agents in the sale of the property. In fact, as noted above, the Appellants 
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were represented by a real estate brokerage firm (which they also have initiated a 
lawsuit against, Stephanie Dygert and Daniel K. Dygert v. Lane Realty, Lane Beatty, 
Coldwell Banker, and Patricia Mason, Civil No 020700185, filed in the Second 
District Court, in and for Davis County, Utah). Further, the defect in this case is not 
related to a condition of the property, unstable soil and subsurface condition of the 
property as in Hermansen, but a matter of the title by reason of a recorded lien. 
Hermansen does not support the propositions upon which the Appellants rely. It is 
pertinent to observe that the Court in Hermansen held: 
f 26 We first cautioned that "if a defect can be 
discovered by reasonable care, the doctrine of caveat 
emptor prevails and precludes recovery by the vendee. 
Clearly in this case, the sign lien is a public record and could have been easily 
discovered by Appellants. In this case the disclosure of a title defect was the 
providence and duty of the title insurer which had a duty to disclose a lease which 
affected title. That matter need, however, not be addressed since the Appellants and 
the title insurer have settled their differences. 
4. Christenson v. Com. Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983). 
Cited by Appellants at pages 19,33,35 and 38 of their Brief. "Finally, as real estate 
developers and agents of the LLC [Clearwater Oaks], Appellees owed the Dygerts a 
duty to supply correct information and about the property being sold." "Accordingly, 
the Dygerts were legally justified in relying upon Appellee's representation of the 
status of title to that property" (Appellants' Brief, pg. 19). "Appellees are real estate 
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developers who owed the Dygerts a distinct duty to supply correct information about 
[the property]'9. (Appellants' Brief, pg. 33). "A buyer may justifiably rely on a 
seller's statements about the true state of title to real property because a buyer has no 
duty to examine official title records in the recorders office to determine whether the 
seller's representations are true". (Appellants' Brief, pg. 35). "Since the Dygerts did 
not have a duty to search the title records." (Appellants' Brief, pg. 38). 
Christenson was an "action to recover damages caused by defendant's 
negligent acknowledgment of a document that incorrectly indicated that certain 
properties held in escrow had unencumbered equity values available as security for 
the plaintiff [Christenson]." (Id. at page 302). 
Neither Mr. Collier nor Mr. Youngberg are title companies nor did they insure 
title of the property, nor were they 'real estate developers', nor were they sellers. 
Clearwater Oaks was the owner and seller. Appellants' reliance on Christenson is 
clearly inappropriate. 
5. Dugan v.Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980). Cited at pages 19,35,37 
and 38 of Appellants' Brief. This case is cited in Christenson. and is cited by the 
Appellants as support for the same propositions as stated in Christenson also at pages 
19, 37 and 38 and therefore those citations will not be addressed herein. At page 35 
of their Brief, Appellants cite Dugan for the proposition "Moreover, a buyer has no 
duty to look behind the seller's statements about real property when the buyer has no 
indication there is a problem with the seller's representation about the property." 
30 
In Dugan, the defendants purchased from the plaintiffs a parcel of land which 
plaintiffs represented to defendants contained 22-3/4 acres. After the sale of the 
property was completed, the defendants discovered that the approximately 8 acres of 
land was useable and remaining acreage was under a river. Defendants informed 
plaintiffs of the discrepancy in acreage and indicated to the plaintiff that all future 
mortgage payments would be made into a bank account until the parties' differences 
were resolved. Plaintiff sued to foreclose on the note signed by defendants at the time 
the property was purchased. 
Again, Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg were not sellers of the property to the 
Appellants. Moreover, it is undisputed that Mr. Collier had absolutely no contact 
with the Appellants until long after the property was purchased by the Appellants. 
6. Robinson v. Tripco Investment 2000 UT App 200,21 P.3d 219. This 
case is cited at pages 19 and 38 of Appellants' Brief. On both pages, the case is cited 
in a footnote for the proposition that "justifiable reliance is generally a jury issue." 
The facts of Robinson involved representations that a building was free of structural 
defects. 
A review of the entire quote by the Court in Robinson is appropriate. The 
Court stated: 
f 19 Thus, "not only must there be reliance, but the 
reliance must be justifiable under the circumstances." 
While the question of whether a plaintiff was reasonable 
in his or her reliance is "usually a matter within the 
province of the jury, there are instances where courts 
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may conclude that as a matter of law, there was no 
reasonable reliance, "(citation omitted). 
f 20 To determine whether the reliance was reasonable, 
the reliance "must be considered with reference to the 
facts of each case." 
Considering the facts of this case, the Trial Court's entry of a summary 
judgment was clearly appropriate. 
1. Reedeker. v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Utah App. 1998). Cited at page 
21 of Appellants' Brief. The Appellants assert with regard to this case 'the personal 
liability of corporate officers and directors - and members or managers of an LLC -
for their individual wrongdoing committed on behalf of a business entity is clear". 
In Reedeker, this Court acknowledged the general rule: 
[a] director is not personally liable for his corporation 
contractual breaches unless he assumed personal 
liability, acted in bad faith or committed a tort in 
connection with the performance of the contract. 
In Reedeker, the plaintiffs were owners of condominium units who appealed 
the dismissal of their claim against past and present trustees and officers (Trustees) 
of an Owners Association (Association) in connection with the Association's decision 
to finance a law suit against CCI Mechanical (CCI) with funds allegedly reserved 
under the Association's bylaws for structural repairs. (Id. at pg. 577). Reedeker 
involved the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §16-6-107(1) which prohibits the 
personal liability of a nonprofit corporation trustee "for civil claims arising from acts 
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or omissions made in the performance of his duties as a trustee or officer, unless the 
acts or omissions are the result of his intentional misconduct." 
The Court in Reedeker stated at page 582, that the corporation is: 
distinct from its officers, shareholders and directors and 
that they will not be held personally liable for the 
corporation's debts and obligations. (Citations Omitted). 
Under this rule, "[a] director is not personally liable for 
his corporation's contractual breaches unless he assumed 
personal liability, acted in bad faith or committed a tort 
in connection with the performance of the contract". 
(Citation Omitted). This is true even where "the director, 
while acting in his official capacity, took actions that 
resulted in the breach." (Citation Omitted). "In so 
immunizing corporate directors from personal liability 
the law has proceeded on the theory that in so acting they 
are but the agents of the corporation and that the breach 
is that of the corporation, and hence it alone is 
answerable therefore." (Citation Omitted). 
In this case, neither Mr. Collier nor Mr. Youngberg is personally liable for an 
alleged breach of Clearwater Oaks' contract, neither assumed personal liability in any 
form, nor did either act in bad faith or commit a tort in connection with the 
performance of the contract between the Appellants and Clearwater Oaks. 
Accordingly, the holding of this case when read in its entirety does not support the 
Appellants' professed position on the expressed subject. 
8. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993). Cited at page 38 of 
Appellants' Brief. Baldwin involved a lengthy description of transactions and 
transfers of real property. On appeal "The primary issues presented on appeal are 
whether (1) a separate, prior action must be filed to set aside a fraudulent conveyance 
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in a suit to foreclose and execute on a lien; (2) the statute of limitations bars an action 
by the Burtons to set aside the fraudulent conveyance; (3) the Baldwins were bona 
fide purchasers when they took the property from Tonya Wood; and (4) the trial 
court's award of attorney fees was reasonable. (Id. at 1192). 
The cite referenced by the Appellants was set forth in the analysis of the 
"statute of limitations" issue presented by the case. The Court in Baldwin stated: 
Baldwin argues that the Burtons were on constructive 
notice of the allegedly fraudulent conveyance and that 
the three-year period began to run on any one of three 
different dates: in May 1980, when the deed from 
Willard Wood to his wife was recorded; in June 1981, 
when Max Burton, Sr., obtained the judgment against 
Willard Wood; or in September 1981, when the deed 
from Tonya Wood to the Baldwins was recorded. The 
Burtons contend that constructive knowledge of a 
transfer or the recording of a deed itself is not enough to 
constitute notice of fraud. They rely on Smith v. 
Edwards, where this court stated, " fMere constructive 
notice of the deed by reason of its being filed for 
record is not notice of the facts constituting the fraud/ 
"Recording a deed or entering judgment alone is not 
enough in some instances to apprize a party of the 
fraudulent nature of a conveyance." (Emphasis 
added). 
(Id. at 1196). 
This case does not involve a fraudulent deed, but a recorded lien filed at the 
Davis County Recorder's Office. Further there is no issue in this case, as in Baldwin, 
concerning 'the fraudulent nature of a conveyance" giving rise to the lien of which 
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Appellants' complain. This case also does not support the proposition as alleged by 
the Appellants. 
9. The remaining Utah cases cited by the Appellants, Von Hake v. 
Thomas. 881 P.2d 895 (Utah App. 1994) (definition of'garden variety' fraud, page 
39 of Appellant's Brief); Low v. Citv of Monticello. 2002 UT 99, 54 P.3d 1153 
(Standard of Review, page 2 of Appellant's Brief); and WebBank v. American 
General Annuity Service Corp., 2002 UT 88,54 P.3d 1139 (Standard of Review, page 
2 of Appellant's Brief) are not addressed since the decisions in these cases do not 
substantively affect the issues of this case. 
10. The foreign cases cited, Murphy Tugboat Co.. Ltd. v. Shipowners and 
Merchants Towboat Co.. Ltd. 467 F.Supp 841 (N.D.Cal 1979) ("A Sherman Act suit 
was brought against San Francisco Bay tugboat companies by former competitor." 
Held "corporate executive will not be held vicariously liable, merely by virtue of his 
office, for the torts of his corporation . . . Personal liability must be founded upon 
specific acts by the individual director or officer... Participation may be found not 
solely on the basis of direct action but may also consist of knowing approval or 
ratification of unlawful acts . . . Such approval or ratification must, however, be of 
acts or conduct which are inherently unlawful".); Ingalls v. Standard Gypsum. L.L.C.. 
70 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. App. San Antonio, 2001) ("Injured employee of limited liability 
company brought negligence action against LLC's members, one of which act as 
employer's management contractor." Held "evidence established that manager-
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member was a "co-employer" for purposes of exclusive remedy provision of 
Workers' Compensation Act, and (2) as a matter of first impression, genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether non manager member had committed an independent tort 
precluded summary judgment for non-manger member, based on a finding of 
'employer" status under Acts exclusive remedy provision.") and PMC, Inc. v. 
Kadisha, 78 Cal App. 4th 1368 (Cal. App. 2d 2000) ("Former employer and its parent 
corporation brought suit alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair 
competition, and interference with prospective economic advantage against former 
employees, corporation in which misappropriate knowledge was allegedly used, and 
its officers directors and principal shareholders." Held "that (1) defendants might be 
held liable based upon their investment and control of corporation if they knew or had 
reason to know of misappropriation of competitor's trade secrets. Summary judgment 
reversed"), and the secondary authority are not addressed since they are not binding 
authority on this Court4 and are equally as non persuasive under the facts as the Utah 
authority cited by Appellants. 
B. Evidence cited by Appellants. 
At page 36 of their Brief, Appellants allege: 
Then, at the time of contracting (May 17,1999) Appellee 
Youngberg provided the Dygerts with a form real estate 
document entitled "Seller's Property Condition 
4
 See Matrix Funding Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm.. 2002 UT 85, 52 
P.3d 1282 [fii 10] 
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Disclosure (Land)" in which he affirmatively 
misrepresented that there was no ongoing litigation 
affecting Lot, 2, that there were no undisclosed 
easements affecting Lot 2, and that there was nothing 
that should be disclosed that materially or adversely 
affect the value of Lot 2. 
The Appellants made the same argument to the Trial Court. (Court Record, 
page 588). The Appellants here also failed to point out the referenced Disclosure, 
(Court Record, page 605, and Addendum C hereto) was signed by Mr. Youngberg as 
a member of Clearwater Oaks. The Disclosure Statement provides, as noted above, 
that it is not a '"warranty" nor a "guarantee". (Court Record, pages 451, 660). 
VI. APPELLANTS 1 AGENCY ARGUMENT IS 
INAPPROPRIATE AND WITHOUT MERIT. 
The Appellants raised the issue of a purported "agency" between Mr. Collier 
and Mr. Youngberg throughout their Brief. These claims were made, but not limited 
to, page 18 ("Under agency law Appellees had a legal duty not to injure the 
Dygerts....", "As members and agents of the LLC selling real property to the 
Dygerts"); page 27 ("The Dygerts' case is also governed by long-standing principles 
of agency law, the agent is responsible to third persons when he is negligent in the 
performance of the duties which he undertakes..."); and page 28 ("tort and agency 
law", "Appellees were acting as members and agents . . . " ) . 
First, it is pertinent to note, that the word "agent" or "agency" or a cause of 
action asserted by an alleged agency is not mentioned in the Appellants' Complaints 
or in any Motion or Memorandum filed by the Appellants in this case. The first 
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mention of an "agency" issue was made in Appellants' Brief. As such, Appellants' 
agency argument is inappropriate, having not been raised in the Trial Court. 
As a general rule, claims not raised before the Trial Court may not be raised 
on appeal. State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346. 
Appellants now assert that Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg are liable to 
Appellants according to the principals of "agency law". Appellants' reliance on 
"agency law" is misplaced. 
If, however, the "agency" between Clearwater Oaks, Mr. Collier, and Mr. 
Youngberg is a created by Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg being members of 
Clearwater Oaks, then, as a matter of law: 
[n]o organizer, member, or employee of a company is 
personally liable under a judgment, decree, or order of a 
court, or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, or 
liability of the company or for the acts or omissions of 
the company or of any other organizer, member, 
manager, or employee of the company. 
(Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-601). 
VIL MR COLLIER AND YOUNGBERG ARE NOT 
PERSONALLY LIABLE TO THE APPELLANTS, 
The issue of duty to be liable in tort was addressed above and therefore will 
not be addressed herein. 
Next, the Appellants state they are not seeking to "pierce the corporate veil" 
or to hold Appellees responsible for the debts or obligations of Appellees5 LLC, 
Clearwater Oaks." (Appellants' Brief, page 20). The transparency of the Appellants' 
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argument is obvious. The Appellants do not dispute that neither Mr. Collier or Mr. 
Youngberg individually acted in any of the negotiations but on behalf of Clearwater 
Oaks (Court Record, page 326), that all documents were signed by Mr. Collier and 
Mr. Youngberg not personally but as members of Clearwater Oaks (Court Record, 
page 326), that neither Mr. Collier or Mr. Youngberg owned the subject property and 
that Appellants purchased the property from Clearwater Oaks (Appellants' Brief, page 
13), that the Appellants were represented by their own real estate agent and that they 
were provided with the preliminary title report for the property which had been 
prepared by Bonneville Title Company (Appellants' Brief, page 14), and that property 
was conveyed to Appellants by Clearwater Oaks (Appellants' Brief, page 15). 
Notwithstanding, Appellants are still attempting to have Mr. Collier and Mr. 
Youngberg held personally liable which can only be done if the veil is pierced. 
Finally, it cannot be disputed that a legal entity may only act though its 
officers, directors, members. Corporations can only act through agents, be they 
officers or employees. Reedeker v. Salisbury. 952 P.2d 677 (Utah App.1998). 
The Appellants, despite their allegation, are clearly and singularly attempting 
to hold Mr. Collier and Youngberg personally liable for the responsibilities of 
Clearwater Oaks. 
The laws of this state are clear that a member of a limited liability company 
is not proper party to a proceeding against the limited liability company (UCA 48-2c-
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116) and that a member of a limited liability company cannot be personally liable for 
any debt of the limited liability company (UCA 48-2c-601). 
VIIL NEITHER MR COLLIER NOR MR YOUNGBERG 
INDIVIDUALLY "OWED MULTIPLE DUTIES" TO THE APPELLANTS, 
A. The Appellants state there is 'the common law duty of 
an agent to a third party with whom the agent transacts on behalf of a principal" citing 
the cases of Penecost and Kaumans. This is Appellants' entire argument on this issue. 
As noted above, the Appellants have failed to establish the predicate for either 
argument, to wit: that they argued agency to the trial court or the facts that establish 
that an agency in fact existed. 
B. The Appellants argue that Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg 
had a "Duty to Refrain from Acts that Were Reasonably Risky". First, the Appellants 
have established no duty by Mr. Collier or Mr. Youngberg individually. And Second, 
the word 'risky' can hardly be considered in the alleged omission of failing to 
disclose a recorded lien on property. 
C. The Appellants next argue that "Appellees are real estate 
developers who owed the Dygerts a distinct duty to supply correct information...." 
While Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg were not 'real estate developers' in this matter. 
The property which the Appellants purchased was purchased from Clearwater Oaks 
which, undisputedly, owned the property. Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg were not 
involved in the sale personally except in executing documents for Clearwater Oaks. 
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Further Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg, as individuals had no duty to the Appellants. 
The Appellants' confusion is based upon the misconception that Mr. Collier and Mr. 
Youngberg "sold real estate to the Dygerts..." (Appellants9 Brief, page 34). 
As noted numerous times above, Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg did not at 
anytime own the property purchased by the Appellants. 
D. The Appellants next argue "A buyer may justifiably rely on 
a seller's statements about the true state of title to real property...." (Appellants9 
Brief, page 34). Once again, Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg did not sell property to 
the Appellants. 
Appellants assert that Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg failed to disclose, 
misrepresented, and/or concealed the Reagan Sign lease affecting Clearwater Oaks' 
subdivision. Appellants acknowledged that the Reagan Lease was recorded as Entry 
No. 1127166, Book 1773, Page 460 in the office of the Davis County Recorder on the 
17th day of May 1994, long before Appellants purchased the property. The Reagan 
Lease, as a matter of law, was of public record. 
Utah Code Ann, §57-3-102(1) provides in relevant part: 
Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, 
in the manner prescribed by this title,... shall from the 
time of recording with the appropriate count recorder, 
impart notice to all persons of their contents. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appellants, as a matter of law, had legal notice of the Reagan Lease. 
Therefore the element of justifiable reliance fails. It is also pertinent to observe that 
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the Appellant, Mr. Dygert, is an attorney. It was the duty of the title company to 
disclose the existence of a lien. Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg had no legal duty to 
the Appellants. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants purchased the property from Clearwater Oaks and all documents 
relating to the transaction were signed by Clearwater Oaks. No documents relating 
to Appellants' purchase of the property were signed by either Mr. Collier or Mr. 
Youngberg personally. At all times relevant hereto, Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg 
were members of the limited liability company, Clearwater Oaks, which sold the 
property to Appellants. 
Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg did not have a legal duty to Appellants nor did 
Mr. Collier and Mr. Youngberg make any misrepresentations and/or omissions on 
which Appellants could reasonably or justifiably rely. 
Finally, it should again be noted, that since legal entities may only act through 
its officers, directors, members, and/or managers, to reverse the Trial Court would 
obfuscate Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-116 and §48-2c-602 and virtually make it 
impossible for legal entities to transact business in this State for fear of who may be 
subject to liability. 
The ruling of the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
42 
DATED this \ y day of August, 2003. 
ROBERT W. HUGHES 
Attorney for Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to Brad 
N. Bearnson and Marty E. Moore, BEARNSON & PECK, L.C., 74 West 100 North, 
Logan, Utah 84321, postage prepaid, this M day of August, 2003. 
^^m 
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Addendum "A" 
Real Estate 
Purchase Contract 
n.'-i i « ^ u L L i c r \ I'lUi r r - i u r t nu . - tMLd'roCdVz J u l . 'J'r ^ y U l L'l :..ijRM P i 
B REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT L"SQ FOR ^ 
REALTOR* r W ^ 
RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION 
This ia a Jegalty binding contract Utah law requires r*al estate licensees to use this form Buyer and Sailer, however, may agroo 
to alter or delete its provision* or to u*« a different form. If you desire legal or tn* advice, consult your attorney
 o r tax advisor. 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
Buyer IX ijU-ly PC'. *-U A fo6Ct; A-^-> <•••*-<•-•• c' • JJ^f ^ K i <•'- offers to purchase the Property 
described below and hereby delivers to'the Brokerage, as Earnest Money, the amount of $ AV ••£•' in the form 
of / ( t M . £ k;7 which, upon Acceptance of this offer by aft parties (as defined in Section 23) 
shall be deposited in acfcoidaqce with state law, ..., .„,
 / / O i 0 / 0 , 
Received by: ^ ^ L / M L ^ i O on ''j)tU+- '7;/7?J (Date! 
Brokerage: ' W/LC £t <( {Uw Phone Number £7?' 7& °' 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1. PROPERTY: 
1.1 Location, The Earnest Money Deposit is given to secure and apply on the purchase of a new Residence (the 
"Residence") described below to be constructed by Seller on a parcel of real property (the "Lot") located at: 
//>V/V- *54X<__ JV-' ' ' . in the City of IA/• I'ttUMtt hit/ County of />V /
 tS _ , State 
of Utah, more particularly described as Lot No. £- in the v.'*<iJ<r '//'•• r~ Subdivision, or alternatively as 
follows: . _, The Purchase Price for the Residence 
^INCLUDES _ DOES NOT INCLUDE, the Lot 
1.2 Home Design. Seller shall construct the Residence and related improvements in accordance with the Plans & 
Specifications checked below and approved by Buyer as provided in Section 6. (check applicable box): 
_ ... House Plan 
_ FHAVA Approved Plan No., 
_ Plans and Declaration of ^ ^^  _ AS RECORDED _ AS PROPOSED for Unit No. 
of the ,
 rr._...r_- Condominiums 
vfs Custom Home (specify) 
_ Other - _ 
1.3 improvements. Seller represents that the Residence will be connected to the utility service lines and serviced by the 
additional improvements identified below, (check applicable boxes): 
(a) Utility Services 
_weil vfpublic water _ private water ytiatura! gas /electricity ^telephone 
•publ ic sewer _ septic tank _ other (specify) _
 i 
(b) Additional improvements 
^/ dedicated paved road _ private paved road _ other road (specify) 
• c u r b & gutter _ rolled curb •'sidewalk /irrigation wafer/secondary system - # of shares 
Name of water company 
_ other (specify) _ _ 
1.4 Permit Feesr Setter agrees to pay for building permit fees, impact fees and ail connection fees except the following: 
1.5 Survey. (Check applicable boxes): A survey { ] WILL [.\] WILL NOT be prepared by a licensed surveyor. The 
survey Work will be: [ ] Property comers staked [ ] Boundary Survey [ ] Boundary & Improvements survey [ } Other 
(specify) . Responsibility for payment: { ] Buyer [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer and Seller share equally. Buyer's 
obligation to purchase underjhis Contract\_\ IS [ US NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the Survey Work. If yes, 
the terms of the attached Survey Addendum apply. 
2. PURCHASE PRICE The Purchase Price for the Residence is S 
2.1 Method of Payment The Purchase Price will be paid as follows: 
$ IOC \ f f (a) Earnest Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described In this Contract, THIS 
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE. 
$ fl^iO&fa (fa) Permanent Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a "Permanent Loan" as provided in Section 2.3 
below. Buyer will apply for one or more of the following loans: _ FHA _ VA 
CONVENTIONAL _ OTHER (specify) 
Buyer agrees to accept the Permanent Loan at the interest rate offered by Buyer's lender as 
aoprcprtata, in the form of collected or ysd funds; and (c) any moneys required to 'c<* "' cy Seller undtr these documents 
hays been deiiverea by Sailer to Buye~L: •';,. JMe escrow/closing office, as appcopc-aiz, in" ; " : . 5rm of collected or cisarad fund$. 
Seller- and Buyer shad each pay one*, ^ if (Vi) of the fee charged by the escrow/do^ng office for lis sen/ices in the 
settlement/closing process. Taxes and assessments forthe currentyear, aind interest en assumed obligations shall be prorated 
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at Settlement as set forth in this Section Prorations set forth \r\ this Section shali be made as of the Settlement Deadline date 
referenced in Section 74(g), unless otherwise agreed 10 in writing by the parties Such writing could include the Settlement 
statement.- The transaction will be considered closed when Sehlemenl has been completed, and when alt of the following.have 
been completed: (a) the proceeds of any new ioen have been delivered by the Lender to Seller (or to the escrow/closing office), 
and (b) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded in the office of the county, recorder. The actions described ir\ 
parts (a) and (b) of the preceding sentence shall be completed within four calendar days afte- Settlement. 
3-. 1 Walk-Through inspection/Completion Escrow. Not less than __ 7 DAYS / / . DAYS prior to Settlement, 
Buyer may conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Residence. ifk as of Settlement, minor work re mains-to be completed, 
corrected or replaced on the Residence, then Buyer, pending completion of such work, may withhold in escrow at Settlement. 
. a reasonable amount agreed to by Seller and 8uyer (or such other amount 5»s is required by the Lander) sufficient to pay for 
completion of such work. If such work \s not completed within _/30 DAYS DAYS after Settlement, ihe amount so 
escrowed may, at Buyer's option, be released to Buyer as.liquidated and agreed damages for failure to complete. The failure 
of Buyer to conduct a walk-through inspection prior to Settlement shall not constitute a waiver by Buyer of the right to receive . 
. on the date of possession, the Residence as required under Section 12. 
4. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within ; _ HOURS _ DAYS after Closing j^OTHER 
(specify) -•'•^•/>x. t
 K. .. y .> ,•' s i ///. r.i *__ 
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract: 
[ V^-V ] Seller's initials [ =,
 ;V ; > I Buyer's Initials 
. The Listing Agent . / / { ' • / / / * *' '" •' { ' . represents J^Seller _ Buyer ^'both Buyer and Seller 
.') ., i , As a Limited Agent 
The Sailing'Agent /<£•/ //(A v f/ ^ - " — •- . represents _ Seller _ Buyer _^both Buyer and Seller 
v , ^ As a Limited Afient 
The Listing Broker '7^- ;'c *•••• /•''• •; (- <-'//' ; , represents _ Seller __ Buyer j^both Buyer and Seller. 
i .
 y / „ , _ As a Limited Agent 
The Selling Broker ^ )J£-fL£ •• A A. A -X ZZl-- , represents _ Salter _ Buyer ^ both Buyer and Seller 
As a Limited Agent 
6. TITLE INSURANCE. Unless Buyer owns, the Lot on the date of Acceptance Seller agrees :o pay at Settlement fora 
standardrcqverage owner's policy of title insurance insuring Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price. Buyer acknowledges 
that additional title insurance coverage against meehanic's liens may beavailable. at Buyer's expense, through an extended 
coverage or plain language title policy. Buyer is advised to consult with a title insurance company during Buyer's Evaluations 
& Inspections regarding the availability and cost of such coverage, 
7*.- SELLER DISCLOSURES, No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(d), Seller shall provide 
to Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the "Seller Disclosures*: 
(a) a SeBer property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller; 
{bj a commitment for the policy of title insurance (if the Buyer does not own the Lot): 
(c) a copy of the recorded CC&R's and Plat for the Development, if any; 
(d). written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental or other problems; 
<e) Plans & Specifications foethe Residence, or reduction copies thereof (with each page initialed by Seller); .-
(f) Name of contractor and contractor's license number: 
(g) Builda^ Warranty (if different from Section 10.2); and 
(h) Other (specify) ^ _ 
8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASEO ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purchase under 
this Contract (check applicable boxes): 
^#3.. _ ..JS^Bfiff conditioned upon Buyers approval pf the content of each of the Seller Disclosures referenced in. 
Section 7; 
._ SS V IS NQT. conditioned upon.Buyer's; approval pf the following tests and evaluations of the Lot (specify): 
lf:any of the above.items are checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8,1. 3 2 and 8.3 apply; otherwise, they do- not apply. 
The Items checked In the affirmative above are collectively referred to as the "Evaluations <& inspections." Unless otherwise 
'provided in this. Contract, :the 'Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by individuals ot 
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entities of Buyer's choice Seller agrees to cooperate with tne Evaluations & insDectio^s 
8 1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline N J "ator thjn tnp Evaluations & Inspcc'ions D^a^ n f rofr>rpnced in Section 
24(e) Buyef must (a) provide Seller will i jvntten nonce Df Buyer s approval of the Evaluations 2. lnsoections (including initialing 
each page of the Plans & Specifications prodded by Sellei under Section 7) or (h) provde Seller wirh written objections 
regardtrg the Evaluations & Inspections 
8.2 Obligation to Approve or Object if. by the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline Buyer fails to orovide Seller #ith 
wntten notice of approval or with written objections as required in Section 8 1 this Contract shall automatically be deemed 
canceled, whereupon the Earnest Money Oeposit shall be released to Buyer uoon receipt of written request from Buyer 
S3 Response to Objections. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller Buyer and Seller bhall have ^1 DAYS 
DAYS after Sellers receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Penod') in * h ch to agree in wnting upon the 
manner of resolving Buyers objections Such writing must include Buyer's anc Seller s initials on each page of the Plans & 
Specifications as submitted by Seller under Section 7, and as modified by Buyer and Seller urder this Section 8 3 Seller may, 
but shall not be required to resolve Buyers objections If Buyer and Seller have net agreed in writing upon the manner of 
resolving Buyer's objections as provided in this Section 8 3 this Contract shall automatically be deemed canceled, whereupon 
the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer 
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There * ARE _ ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms If there ar*7 the 
terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference _ Addendum No. _/ 7 ^ j - ( A l L L 
_ Survey Addendum _ Seller Financing Addendum _ FHAA/A Loan Addendum Other IsoecHv) I ' * 
10. SELLER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTATIONS 
ICLlCondition of Title Unless the Buyer owns the Lot on the date of Acceptance, Seller represents that Seller has fee 
title to the Property and will convey good and marketable title to 3uyer at Closing by general warranty deed The Residence 
will be delivered to Buyer at Closing, free and clear of mechanic's hens and claims for rnecnanic's liens Buygr agrees however, 
to accept title to the Property subject to easements, deed restrictions; CC&R's (meaning covenants, conditions and 
restrictions), and nghts of way, and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agi eed to by Buyer under 
Section 8 Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowner's association dues, utilities, and other services 
provided to the Property after Closing* If Seller owns the Lot, Seller will pay ofr by Closing, all mortgages, trust deeds, 
judgments, mechanic's hens tax liens ard warrants Seller agrees to pay current at Settlement all assessments and 
homeowners association dues 
10,2 Condition of Property Unless Seller is providing an alternate Builder s Warranty unoer Section 7(g) (in which case 
this Section 10 2 shall not apply) Seller { NJ does [ 3 does not warrant the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sprinkler 
systems (including all gas and electric appliances), fixtures, and structural elements of the Residence \ including the roof, walls, 
and foundation} against defects in matenal and workmanship for a penod of one year after the Settlement Deadline* Seller 
further warrants that as of the date Seller delivers possession of the Residence to Buyer, any pnvaie well or septic tank serving 
the Residence shall have applicable permits and shall be in working order zrrt fit for its Intended purpose 
11. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION. The Residence shall be considered "Substantially Complete" when occupancy of the 
Residence is allowable under the rules ordinances and laws of the appropriate civil jurisdiction in which the Residence is 
located, in the absence of such governmental regulations, Substantia! Completion shall be when1 the Residence ts ready for 
occupancy and only minor work remains to be completed, corrected or replaced Subject to the exceptions referenced in 
- Section 12, the Substantia! Completion Deadline shall be as referenced in Section 2^(i\ Seller shall provide Buyer written 
notice of Substantial Completion of the Residence. 
11.1 CONSTRUCTION ACCESS Buyer agrees that during the period of construction Seller shall have the unrestneted 
nght to access the Lot for the purpose of construction of the Residence and any necessary subdivision improvements Buyer 
shall have the right to reasonable inspection of the Residence Provided however Seller resen/es the right to limit Buyer's 
inspection of the Residence in onder to not hinder, interfere, or delay the work Buyer assumes all risks and liability associated 
with all such inspections. 
12. PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS. The Plans & Specifications contain descriptions of the type of matenate to be used in 
finishing the Residence, a dollar allowance for specific items (including landscaping, if applicable), and copies of the floor plans 
and elevations for the Residence. Buyer's selection of color, grade and type of finishing materials (including appliances, floor 
coverings, fixtures, cabinets, etc) may differ from the Plans & Specifications, and may change the Substantial Completion 
Deadline and the Purchase Price. No change shall be made to the Plans & Specifications except by a written Change Order 
signed in advance by Buyer and Sellerwhich sets forth (a) the change to be made (b) any adjustment m the Purchase Pnce, 
and (c) any change In the Substantial Completion Deadline All changes shall be paid for at the time of signing the Changs 
Older or as mutually agreed in writing by the parties. Seller agrees to construct the Residence tn substantial compliance with 
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(he Plans & Specifications Buyer acknowledge tnat the Residence upon Substantial Completion raav vary from exact 
dimensions snown on the Plans ^ Spec '"cations " ^ 'he extant that a choice of coior grad? or t,pc of material is required 
8u/er shall notify SeWei in witmg of such selections no later than _ 10 DAYS
 m DAYS ahe receipt of Seller's written 
request for si/ch selections If Buyer has nor notified Seller in writing of sucn selections as set forh above Seller shall have 
the right to make said selections at Sellers sole discration reasonably exerased, to avoid delay in Substantia Completion 
of the Residence 
12.1 CONSTRUCTION COMPLIANCE Construction of the Residence shall be in accordance with the standards and 
requirements of all applicable federal State and Local governmental laws ordinances and regulations, and in compliance 
"with restrictive covenants applicable to the Lot If any regulatory requirements for construction of the Residence change dunng 
the course of construction stnd result m an increase in the costs of labor and/or mate'' als, the Seller reserves the right-to adjust 
the Purchase Price for the Residence to correspond with such regulator/ changes In such event, the Seller shaii provide the 
Buyer with a scecific descnption of the regulatory change(s) and an itemization of the costs incurred to comply with the 
change(s) 
12.2 UNAVOIDABLE DELAY, In the ev^rt the Residence is not Substantially Complete oy tne date provided in Section 
24(0 of this Contract due to interruption of transport, availability of materials, strikes, fire, flood, weather, governmental 
regulations, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of the Seller, the Substantial Completion Deadline shall 
be extended, by written agreement, for a reasonable penod based on the nature of the delay Seller agrees to provide Buyer 
written notice of the nature of the delay no later than ^15 DAYS DAYS after commencement of the delay 
12.3 INSURANCE. During the penod of construction and until Closing, the Seller shall maintain In full force and effect, 
at the Seller's expense, an aff-nsk insurance policy for the full replacement value of all completed portions o f improvements 
included in the Residence; and all construction materials located on-site, complete coverage workmen's compensation 
insurance to insure against all claims of persons employed to complete the Residence, and, unless otherwise provided herein, 
public liability insurance in an amount not less than _ $500,000 S _ . 
12.4 PROTECTION AGAINST LIENS AND CIVIL ACTION. $oticeis'her6b/ provided in accordance with Section 38-11. 
108 of the Utah Code that under Utah law Buyer may be protected against liens being maintained against an "owner-occupied 
residence" and from other civil action being maintained to recover monies owed for "qualified services" performed or provided 
by suppliers and subcontractors as a pan of this Contract, ft and only if the conditions required by law a<*e satisfied, including 
the following. (2) Buyer must enter into a wntten contract with either an "original contractor" who is properly licensed or exempt 
from ^censure, or with a "real estate developer" and (b) Buyer must pay Seller in full in accordance witn this Contract and any 
written amendments to tnis Contract. Buyer must be the owner of an owner-occupied residence that Is a detached single-family 
unrt or duplex. 
13» AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate limited liability company, or other 
entity, the person executing this Contract on its behai? warrants his or her authonty to do so and to bind Buyer and Seller 
44. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together wrth its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, 
constitutes the entire Contract between the partes and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations 
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts oetween the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by 
wntten agreement of the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION* The parties agree that any dispute, easing pnor to or after Closing; related to this Contract 
/SHALL _ MAY (upon mutual agreement of the parties) first be submitted to mediation, if the parties agree to mediation, 
me dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party 
agrees tobear its own costs of mediation If mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this Contract 
Shall apply. Nothing irt this Section-15 shall prohibit any perty-from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation 
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to 
return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce thts Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Seller defaults, in 
addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to tne Earnest 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages,, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies 
available at lawT If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages. Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon 
demand, ft is understood that denial of a loan application made by the Buyer is not a default and is governed by Section 
2.4(b). 
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the prevailing 
partyshail be entitled topcoats and reasonable attorney fees However, attorney fees shall not be awarded for participation 
in mediation under Section 15 
18. NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, ail notices required under this Contract must be (a) 1n writing, (b) signed 
FROM : COLLIER MGi RHONE NO. : 8612967389 J u l . 39 dkMl l i i obHn Hb 
)y the party giving notice; and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the.applicable date 
refereoced m this Contract. 
ABROGATION.. Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1. 10.2, 12, 12.1, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in 
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shafi not apply after Closing. 
20; RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Residence, including physical damage or destruction to the Property or its 
i^iTO^ij(trents";dus^to--,any". cause, except loss caused byateking.in'erninent domain, shall be borne by Seller "until the 
transaction b closed 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract. EExtensions must be 
agreedta in writing-by-ail parties. Unless otherwise explicitly"stated in this Contract: (a) performance under each Section of 
thts. Contract.which references a date shall absolutely be requited by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated.date; and (b).the 
term Hdays?.:sbail mean calendar days and shall be countecf<beginningon the day following the event which triggers the timing. 
requirement(te:, Acceptance, receipt of the Seller Disclosures, etc.) Performance dates and times referenced hereirrshali 
notb&htading upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed 
to in Writing..by such non-party. 
22::;FAX:TRANSMJSS(ON AND COUNTERPARTS.-Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any 
addexxla.and-.copnieroffeFs, and the retransmission of.any signed fax shall be the-same as deliver/ of an origmal/This 
Contractand any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts. 
23.. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to.an offer or counteroffer of theother: (a) signs 
the offeror counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other .party's 
agent that the offer orcounteroffer has been signed as required. 
24. -CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller agree.that the following deadlines shall apply to mis Contract 
' ' (a) Application Deadline . fiUx.4 . » / . / ? ? - ? _ ( D a f e ) 
\b) Pre-Quaiificatlon Deadline ^7lU\'i ff\ . t*!*!^ (Date) 
(c f Constructfon Loan Funding Deadline •' ''^fl::/'k • •_, '••&-'--^?' - .' '' ' ' (Date? 
.(d). SeMer Disclosure Deadline ^ ' < u ^ " ' j y 7-7*7 ^1 (Date) 
(^Eva luat ions & Inspections Deadline vky^:^ J/ "• •*?*?<?' (DMt) 
• ^ ^ubs t to f i aVCbmp le t l oh Deadline A/f t/;~3/f ,;<?*?<?''• :/ (Date] 
'(g)-Settlement Deadline ^ days after the Buyer's receipt of written 
"'"'"
:
''
 :\ll ' '' v. Notice ^SufastantlarCompletfoh 
•25::-.Of PER ANYTIME FOR ACC£F£TANCE. Buyer offers to-purchase the Property on the above tenms.and conditions/-Ifc-
•^ le ' r ipe i^ !ot acae*p/-this: offer by:' ' " . .
 —
 AM'^'-PM;Mo"Unt?iin Time on 'fDJateffc friis 
; oftefi.sh^&pse; arid the brokerage shall return the Earnest Money Depositio Buyer. 
• • • • • • ' y 
" x^t%^ rnrni; fry- .. „;y 4 ^ ^ ' A ^ ^ JM^0I\ 
( B ^ ^ S i g h a t u r i ) . . • : ; * ; • ?% * ' (OfferDate? \B\fy4f$Signature) . 0 (Offer0ate)'.. :-
>v : ; . T&* laterof the above Offer Dates shall be referred to as the "Offer Reference Date" 
(Buyeis^Names} -(PLEASE pRfHT) , - r (Notice.- Address) "•••• • • J (Phone) ' - ••' . 
ACC^PTANCE/COUNTTEROFFER/REJECT«ON 
CH^KONE: 
^ ^ A C ^ E ^ ^ Se l te r :>^p ts ihfe foregoing offeroo .the terms and ^d i t i b f f c 
?^^V'S'.--'. .'•'.'•.•'. .;'.'•::. "':.'- '• ..- ' .. ••'V.'* V'..-: . * .:.,-,..'.* ,.'..-. '• •• -..'•,//:W;i^^£i 
# & f ^ AQOENDtf i v t N O ^ ^ 
:;(ttme) (Sellers Signature) "<Date)r(| 
rnu\-<- WJ, . o t u r o r a ^ Jul.. tTr1 i^jyi il.'37hM Pb 
r,\SL ,U* i V l L 
''Sellers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address) (Phone)
 s 
<B^ - T I V £ - ^ ^-AC-
REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer. 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Sellers Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
.: State law-requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seiterwiih coptesrofthist^ontraci bearing ail signatures: (Fill in applicable section below.) 
A,. I acknowiedgejracsipt of a firuaf copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures: 
'{Buy eiV Signature} ^ (Date)^ (Buyers Sigrtaidr<>'\3' "(Date) 
(Seller1? Signature^ ^ ^ _ \ {Dat^ (Setter's Signature) .(Date). 
-&; 1 personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing att signatures to bs [ } faxed { ] mailed [ ] hand delivered on 
. • .' • • (Dale) postage prepaid, to .the [. J.Seiier [ . ] Buyer, Sent/Delivered by (specify) . • • •-. : • 
.THlS:FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17.1936. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FOftM, 
FROM : CXLIER ,'1GT FHCNE h'G : 81? 129^999 J u l . Sb _^J1 11: ^bHv! r*. 
a 
RtALrpj?.'1 
ADDENDUM NO. 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT Page of. 
THIS IS AN H ADDENDUM [ J COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with 
an Offer Reference Date of "])itin/ / 7 - / 7 7 7 including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between 
i as Buyer, anc
 a s seller 
regarding the Property located at /4Xd <v $d'J Ul kJ' • I'j/r/?7 The 
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC: 
4 fUC OZLa^ / r f / f f f 
4 ICCC. fULfi £ / f f f 
4 ictc • <c.(d is. /ill 
d u.r>r. l i t AT m? 
p JjW, As (UU^^u*. 
S » , 77—'TTJ—— TL 7~i~ 1 7-7~y Z — - * — 
u 
&•(*<-•*-«- *t t ^ . 'tifetfu !&u4-t,<y JL <^M.IA_J & 4J~f>t^< 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of tha REPC, including all pnor addenda and counteroffers, 
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until [ ] A M [ ]PM 
Mountain Time on (Date), to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse 
DtfBuyer [ ] Seller S i g n a l e d ( D a t e ) '{Tinfe) J i ^Buyer [ ] £ s | ^ ! g n a t u r e (Dfcte) (Time) 
ACCEPTANCEyCOUNTEROFFER/REJECTiON 
CHECK ONE: 
[ 1 ACCEPTANCE: [ ] Salter [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM. 
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. . 
v^L^i2U^-V 5-'7-11 
(Signature) \ \ ^ A - (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date; (Time) 
[ 1 REJECTION: [ j g a i e r f ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17.1998. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM, 
' 2 / 2 1 / 9 9 Ti/E 1 5 : 1 3 FAX 0<M 2 * V 7 1 o ' i i-Arvii i ^ U . n iJOiNM-.\ H.i.h i&'uu* 
•g 
ADDENDUM NO. 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT P*£* of 
THIS IS AN [wj^DDENOUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the ••REPC") with 
.an Offer Reference Date of ^J,^^' W?f .including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between 
DlKUl kL %•• S&Phj/Hi t. a. Jlhfltf as Buyer, and EJLJJtM)d±i A J d-AJ/J. L. - a , as Seller, 
regarding the P r a ^ located a t " ^ / ^ " ^ /=/ • <ff^ XA /</ ^ r , RfiffAtzjp cc/ The 
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC; ^ 
^&**6£ ~+**^ A^ ^£&£*£- gin 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of th* REPC, including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, these terms shall control All other terms of th* REPC, Including all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same, { J Seller [ J Buyer shall have until [ ]AM[ ]PM 
Mountain Time on _ [Date), to acoept tha terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted., the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
rer [ ],&tler#hnature (Date) (Time) [s] Buyer f ) Seller Signatuitf^ (Date) (TlmeV^^ Juy J/Sei *n5rgnat \S\ tLT^/ a i m e ) ^ 
ACCePTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE; .-..-— 
JL^tfCEFTANCE: [ ^S^fjer [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terns of this ADDENDUM. 
t ] CO.lJNTeROFF|R: J ISeJIor [ ]£uv*r presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. 
SjgrfSture^ L- , /(Date) (Time) . (Signature) (Dale) (Time) 
I J REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION ANO THE OFFICE OP THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
EFPECTTVE AUGUST 17,19SS* IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORW. 
FPCh : CCLLIER NT
 FHCNE hO. 8012997S99 . , , , . <* ^ L i . ^ r . 0 
99 YiLU 14 55 FAX »01 ib /161 L O E k^ALi'* ^ 0 0 2 
•*w»«T««ntr 
ADDENDUM NO. 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT *»*« of 
THIS JS AN H'ADDENDUM -[ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (tba 'REPC") with 
an Offer Reference Djts of rtf£L&M^-, / f %f , including all prior addenda and counteroffers. Detwesn 
hiM.U L /^. %- PfiZjOkuCtiJ!* (KH-iAsk Buyer, and as Seller, 
regarding the Prooert/locatedat 7 ?"~ /£#£/J- &SVA1' id> /mtXZ • The 
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC: ^ 
ML*utL*J.£aJtJ* (&UJL- Jf7gt/50*, 4L 
fiobu^ L££ZJtL 
JjJJL-i &70. a a 
tjLlLu AJMM. /&»**• St, 
/ - CTttdLSdU* f/Ju*ur~*t8il11r~3i3 
/&fJ>-&2~~ 
%{£to *¥&&-"> 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provision* of the REPC, including atf prior addenda 
and counteroffers, those terms shalt control All other terms of the REPC, Including all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
not modified by thte ADDENDUM shail remain the same. ( J Seller [ ] Buyer shall have una [ l AM \ ]PM 
Mountain Time ort (Date), vo accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth rn this ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
3**/**** *7:ia *.„ 
_[iffiuYtv [ \ I Seife'r Stature (Date) (Time) [ } Buyer [ ] Setter Signature (Date) (Time) 
ACCEPTANCE^OUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECJ^ONE: 
[ t^ACClSPTANCE: [ ] Seller ( J Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM, 
. _[ I COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. 
(Signature) ^ ' ^ ^ T N T " * 0 3 ^ (Thtie) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
[ ] REJECTION: [ J Seller! ] Buyer^jects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROV33 BY TOE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFRCE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17.198*. IT REPLACES AMD -SUPfiKSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS PQRM, 
Addendum "B" 
Plat Map 
AND MERIDIAN. - WEST BOUNTIFUL CITY, UTAH %sU*2^r 
NE 1 3 9 1 . 7 9 S (T20"5i ' E 2653.00' BAStS OF BORING 
' 1 M B ) . V v i M 
•~«>M in MOO 
rO'JND MONUMENT At SO<<rilEAST CORNER-
SEC M. T2N. R1W SL8&M 
N 1239*5.47 
E t1J068.H7 
1077.99' 
3D7S /J'F&XfiuJ^t- U-^Tfi-*L^ 
~] 1258.21 
w ^M JP J 
P O B 
N 125203 6€ 
r 1 t o t t o • « 
Addendum "C" 
Seller's Property 
Condition 
Disclosure 
a 
ALTOR* 
E L L E R N A M E _ 
ROPERTY ADDRESS / Tax I.D. # 
ISTING BROKERAGE Lg>v \ -g , 
SELLER PROPERTY CONDITION DlL ^ LOSURE 
(LAND) 
[LISTING AGENT Complete This Section ONLY] 
EQUAL HOUSING 
OPPORTUNITY 
ReaAA 1 
(the "SELLER") 
. (the "PROPERTY") 
_ (the "COMPANY") 
[SELLER (ONLY) Complete and Sign Remainder of Form] 
OTICE TO SELLER. Each Seller is obligated under law to disclose to the Buyer all facts known to Seller that materially or adversely 
feet the value of the Property and that are not readily observable. This disclosure statement is designed to assist the Seller in 
implying with these disclosure requirements and to assist the Buyer in evaluating the Property. The Company, and other real estate 
okerages and agents will also rely upon the information contained in this disclosure statement. 
DTICB TO BUYER. This is a disclosure of the Seller's knowledge of the condition of the Property as of the date signed by the Seller 
id is not a substitute for any inspections or warranties that the Buyer may wish to obtain. THIS IS NOT A WARRANTY OF ANY KIND 
/THE SELLER. 
DMPANY REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING PROPERTY. The Company and its agents are trained in the marketing of real estate. 
either the Company nor its agents are trained or licensed to provide the Buyer with professional advice regarding the physical condition 
any property or regarding legal or tax matters. Accordingly, neither the Company nor any of its agents will make any representations or 
arranties regarding the physical or legal condition of the Property, including, but not limited to, the square footage, acreage, or the 
:ation of property lines. THE COMPANY AND ITS AGENTS STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT IN CONNECTION WITH ANY OFFER 
) ACQUIRE THE PROPERTY, THE BUYER RETAIN THE PROFESSIONAL SERVICES OF LEGAL AND/OR TAX ADVISORS, 
ROPERTY INSPECTORS, SURVEYORS, AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS TO SATISFY THE BUYER AS TO ANY AND ALL 
3PECTS OF THE PHYSICAL AND LEGAL CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY. 
UTILITY SERVICE Yes No Unknown @ LAND(CONX) Yes * No Unknown 
i. Does natural gas service 
the Property? x 
Location of nearest gas line. 
Does public sewer service the 
Property? X 
I. Location of nearest sewer line? SV^U 
. Is the Property approved for 
septic tank use? 
Is there electrical service to 
the Property? 7< 
X 
. Location of nearest electrical line. s y 0 \ p K*\ P C ^ C T M 
Is there telephone service 
to the Property? V 
Location of nearest telephone service line? ^V-? ^ ^ ^ I £ \ 
Is the Property assessed as 
Greenbelt? 
|(o) Are there wetlands on the 
1 Property? 
1(d) Is the Property located in a 
1 flood zone? 
(e) Do you know of any present or 
past drainage or flood problems 
1 affecting the Property? 
(T) Do you know of any encroach-
ments or boundary line disputes 
or easements affecting the 
Property? 
rr 
X 
X 
X': 
(Z) HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS 
Are there any existing hazardous conditions on the Property, 
such as methane gas, radio-active material, landfill, mineshaft, 
toxic materials? 
[ ] Yes ty No [ ] Unknown 
Have you had any environmental testing performed on the 
Property? [ ]Yes [yjNo 
4. OTHER MATTERS 
) Have you received any notices 
by any governmental or quasi-
governmental agency adversely 
affecting the Property? 
a. Is there any existing or threatened legal action affecting 
the Property? [ ] Yes ^ ] No [ ] Unknown 
b. Do you know of any violation of local, state, or federal 
laws or regulations relating to the Property? 
[ ] Yes J$ No ^ ^ 
) LAND (SOILS, DRAINAGE AND BOUNDARIES) 
Yes No Unknown 
) Is there any fill or expansive 
soil on the Property? 
\ Do you know of any sliding, 
settling or earth movement on 
the Property? 
X 
y 
/ * 
§) HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS 
Is the Property part of a homeowners association? 
[ ] Yes [ ^ N o [ ] Unknown If the answer to this 
question is "No", disregard the remainder of this section. 
(b) Does the homeowners association levy assessments for 
maintenance of common areas and/or other common 
expenses? [ ]Yes [>] No [ ] Unknown 
(5) HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS (C . f.) 
[(c) For any questions regarding the homeowner's association, 
contact: (if known) 
Name: 
Address: 
Phone: (_ 
Seller authorizes the release of information to Buyer regarding 
the condition of the Property and current and future assessments. 
@ls there a Master Association for the Property? If yes, 
provide name and contact person for association on an 
addendum. 
6. WATER RIGHTS Yes No Unknown Water Right # 
Well, Spring, Water Company or 
Other Water Source 
1 a. Are there any culinary water 
rights with the Property? 
l b . Is a culinary water source in 
j place for the Property? 
1 c. Location of nearest culinary _-
water line. i 
1 d. Are there any irrigation water 
rights with the Property? 
1 e. Is there an irrigation water source 
and distribution facility in place 
for the Property such as canals, 
j ditches or pressurized system? 
1 f. Are there separate shares 
in a water company with the 
Property? If yes, # of Shares 
! Name of Mutual Water Company 
\k 
V 
XPccV P O O V \ V , \ U \ C ^ S j 
7 ( 3 ^ P j 
ro«\ \ J 
V 
f 
"n 
^e\>t' fc\i\ 
P r e c ^ C v ^ A ^ ' ' V 
IF THE ANWER IS "YES" TO ANY OF THE QUESTIONS IN SECTIONS 1.K., 2, 3 AND 5, (WHICH ARE CIRCLED), PROVIDE AN 
EXPLANATION ON AN ATTACHED ADDENDUM. 
Is there anything else which you should disclose to Buyer because it may materially or adversely affect the value or desirability of the 
Property: W ^ 
SELLER REPRESENTS THAT, TO THE BEST OF SELLER'S KNOWLEDGE, THE INFORMATION SET FORTH IN THE FOREGOING 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT IS ACCURATE AND COMPLETE. THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT IS NOT A WARRANTY OR 
GUARANTEE OF ANY KIND BY SELLER. SELLER HEREBY AUTHORIZES THE COMPANY TO PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION TO 
PROSPECTIVE BUYERS AND TO REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND AGENTS. SELLER UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES THAT SELLER 
WILL NOTIFY THE COMPANY IN WRITING IMMEDIATELY IF ANY INFORMATION SET FORTH IN THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
BECOMES INACCURATE OR INCORRECT IN ANY WAY 
Seller: i r~g-J2l !l_ Vv^W- Date: 5 ^ n ~ " ^ ° t Seller: Date: 
ANY REPRESENTAtlONSJ REGARDING ACREAGE OF THE PROPERTY ARE APPROXIMATIONS ONLY BUYER IS 
RESPONSIBLE TO VERIFY THE ACCURACY OF SAID APPROXIMATE ACREAGE TO BUYER'S SATISFACTION FENCES MAY 
NOT CORRESPOND WITH ACTUAL BOUNDARIES OF THE PROPERTY 
RECEIPT AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF BUYER 
3UYER HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. BUYER FURTHER 
ACKNOWLEDGES THAT BUYER HAS BEEN ADVISED BY THE COMPANY TO SEEK COMPETENT PROFESSIONAL ADVICE 
=ROM PROPERTY INSPECTORS AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE CONDITION OF THE 
PROPERTY AND THE DISCLOSURES CONTAINED HEREIN. BUYER FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT NEITHER THE 
COMPANY, NOR ANY OF ITS AGENTS, WILL MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES REGARDING THE CONDITION 
)F THE PROPERTY OR REGARDING THE ACCURACY OF ANY STATEMENTS RELATING TO THE CONDITION OF THE 
PROPERTY CONTAINED HEREIN. , 
Juyer: [ /'-...-:„ Date: Buyer: 7, Dafp-
